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This paper has possibly a very different preoccupation than motivated Lucien Hardy in
developing his famous paper, ‘Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms’ (arxiv.org/
quant-ph/0101012). This paper comes out of a consideration of Hilbert’s Sixth Prob-
lem (http://euclid.unh.edu/∼ jjohnson/Hilbert.html), the axiomatisation of physics, as
focussed by Wigner [8] in a famous discussion of the Problem of Quantum Measurement
(arxiv.org/quant-ph/0502124).
Hilbert meant an axiomatisation of the physical concepts analogously to how he and
others axiomatised the mathematical concepts of geometry. As he and others had elimi-
nated the need for diagrams or intuition from plane geometry, so he hoped mathematicians
could eliminate the need for physical intuition from physics. From this standpoint, which
is one close to Wigner’s (or at least he shows a sensitivity and awareness of it), Hardy’s
so-called axiomatisation is quite alien. We will focus on what Hilbert himself singled out
as fundamental, the concept of physical probability.
This concept was salient in Hilbert’s time, as the controversy between Boltzmann and
Zermelo showed, but has become even more foundational in physics since 1925.
ON page 10, Hardy re-states his first axiom, which we quote:
‘Axiom 1 Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion
of times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value (which we
call the probability) for any case where a given measurement is performed on
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an ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n
becomes infinite.
What I want to claim here is more radical than any comment that he has chosen
the ‘wrong’ interpretation of probability, or the ‘wrong’ axiomatisastion of Quantum Me-
chanics. This is simply not an axiom at all. (Dirac and von Neumann are much closer
to Hilbert’s spirit in this regard: at least each axiom of theirs, taken individually, is an
axiom, even though when taken collectively, there are subtle problems which Wigner was
aware of.) He has not specified which are the undefined, primitive terms, and which are
the constraints being imposed on the usage of those terms by the axioms.
Is this a definition of probability? The term “limit” is undefined so it is not completely
spelled out. In neither mathematics, nor physics, does the word ‘limit’, by itself, have a
definite meaning.
Is this a physical axiom? It could, at first sight, be a physical axiom that
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
ft(vo)dt
always exists—or lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
fv0(t),
as the case may be—and is, by definition, then set equal to the notion “probability.” It
has not, up to now, been thought that in the real world this limit did always exist. But
let us adopt this as an axiom anyway.
Here, fv0 is a sequence (or in general a continuous function). Its definition is fv0 = 1
if the nth trial is success, 0 if failure. (There is an issue of constructionism here which is
irrelevant). If fv0 is not a deterministic function of t (and v0 the initial condition) then
Hardy has not defined “limit.” If it is one of the usual definitions of ‘limit’, fv0 must be
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a function in the usual sense of pure mathematics, a subset of V × N × {0, 1} such that
pi1(x) = pi1(y) and pi2(x) = pi2(y) implies pi3(x) = pi3(y) where pii means projection onto
the ith factor. If it isn’t, Hardy has totally missed the point of axiomatics.
So let us assume that the axiom states that such a function f exists. That is, whenever
the physical set up he mentions exists, then that physical set up yields a function fv0 : N→
{0, 1} as above, and then the limit exists mathematically and agrees with the mathematical
notion of probability.
There are several major difficulties with this. Firstly, logic gates. It must be possible
to combine the results of two independent sequences of measurements f1v0 , f
2
w0
into one
sequence gv0,w0 by means of logic gates, for example gv0,w0(n) = f
1
v0
(n) & f2w0(n). This
is a physically realisable measurement. But even if f1v0 and f
2
w0
satisfy the axiom, gv0,w0
need not. (No amount of noise will mask this effect if the noise also obeys the axiom.)
Secondly, his other axioms do not allow us to say that fv0 exists. (Most interpretations
rule out the existence of fv0 .)
Hence fv0 cannot be a function even for given v0 (except in special cases). But then
the notion of “limit” is undefined. Thirdly, in mathematics probability is modeled by a
measure, or else he should propose an alternative. He can’t say what space his physical
probability is a measure on, even in the classical physics case! the space cannot be the
space of all mathematical sequences, and he has not defined any other space.
Hardy exhibits a deep (although typical) conceptual confusion over whether he is
axiomatising physical probability or mathematical probability. These are two separate
problems even though once one is finished solving each one separately there remains the
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last task of showing that the one is a model for the other.
Mathematical statements are only a model for physical statements. For example, ‘3’
is not a primitive concept in mathematics, it is the set of all sets equipotent to . . . etc.
But the physical concept of ‘3’ would, if axiomatised, not have the same logical structure
at all. Then one checks that the physical axioms imply that then mathematical axioms
are true when given the physical interpretation of the model.
The problem even for the limited context of classical mechanics and Kolmogorof-
fian probability was not really touched until von Plato’s [7] important Ergodic Theory of
Probability, of 1988, and finished by me in 1990 with The Logical Structure of Probability
Assertions (arxiv.org/quant-ph/0508059). This last extends to non-Relativistic Quantum
Mechanics and any finite or renormalisable Quantum Field Theory.
Kolmogoroff, indeed, realised and admitted[4] it had not been touched. Hence his
work of the ‘60’s on algorithmic complexity as a definition of randomness. But neither he
nor his followers made a logically specific connection with physics so it remains a project
rather than a theory. There is no rival, yet, to von Plato’s (and my) theory.
Assuming that the mathematical axiomatisation of classical probability theory is the
measure-theoretic one developed by Kolmogoroff, one would have to ask of the physical
conception of probability of Hardy’s, how can the space (where the measure lives on) be
defined? Is it the space of all (mathematical) sequences of results of measurements? Or
only those which are ‘physical’ in some vague ill-defined sense? The whole task is to
make that sense precise. (The thermodynamic limit does this.) It can’t be the space of
all sequences of observations, since that space, although a measure space, possesses an
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element, i.e., a sequence, not having a frequency. It can’t be the subspace of that space
consisting of all those sequences possessing frequencies, since that space is, as we remarked,
obviously not closed under simple physically implementable combinations of observations.
Could he try to rule out the counter-examples under discussion by imposing a physical
condition? (This would be analogous to Kolmogoroff’s attempt to impose a condition on
the sequences by imposing a logical constructibility condition on the algorithm which
would construct the sequence.) This is no easy task, as the vicissitudes of Kolmogoroff’s
project showed. It would necessitate making the sequence of observations a determined
function of a physical specification of the experimental set-up, instead of ‘random.’ (Or
else specifying a new definition of limit instead of using one of the normal ones: this
in fact is what is done in the ergodic theory of probability and in its generalisation.)
It would necessitate subsuming both measurement and transformation under one over-
arching concept of ‘physicality’, i.e., dealing with Wigner’s problem and Bell’s objection [1].
(http://euclid.unh.edu/∼ jjohnson/Bellagainst.html). The whole idea of random variable
shows this: its logical structure is, unfortunately, that the event is a deterministic function
of something . . . an element of a measure space, a hidden variable. If he insists on using
the usual notion of limit of a function (or sequence), then the physics must specify a
mathematical object which is a function (or sequence), and he can’t do this. IMHO, it
is preferable to abandon that road and instead define by physical procedures a measure
of total mass one in some other specified way. It does not really seem practical to model
the idea of a sequence of measurements by a mathematical sequence. It is necessary to
have the physical specification of that measure agree with experiment in the sense that
the calculations, using the mathematical theory of probability, performed on that measure,
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agree to within experimental error with the observed probabilities which form the backbone
of the experimental support for Quantum Theory. But we would not need to have a naive
structure of ‘events’ and ‘outcomes.’
TEN THESES ON THE AXIOMATISATION OF PHYSICS
1.The experimental evidence, even today, still points to Dirac’s axioms, except possibly
the reduction of the wave packet.
2.The salient defect of these axioms is merely what Wigner pointed to, their dual
overlap: a measurement can be analysed in two seemingly incompatible ways.
3.The foundations of physical probability are in a logically unsatisfactory state, so it
is at least conceivable that fixing this could be part of the solution.
4.The frequency theory of probability is logically circular, as is well known (Kolmogo-
roff[4], Burnside[2], Littlewood[5]). But it is so well-supported experimentally that what
is needed is a logically unexceptionable theory of the physical meaning of a probability as-
sertion that remains as close as possible to the frequency theory. Von Plato has provided
one, and his suggestion can be improved.
5.Statistical Mechanics, in its logically careful formulation, does not use open systems,
coarse-graining, ‘information’, infinite systems, or entropy.
6.Dirac’s axioms do not allow one to talk about open systems except in the same way
one was accustomed to do in classical physics (as Hamiltonian heat baths).
7.A concept, such as mixed state or density matrix, can be rigourously defined in terms
of the primitives of Dirac’s axiom system, but it does not thereby acquire any independent
physical meaning. Since logical definitions are merely abbreviative, saying ‘mixed state’
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is merely an abbreviation for a complicated logical assemblage of statements about pure
states, probabilities, coefficients, linear combinations, etc. (Russell [6], p. 4.)
8.It behooves us to investigate whether or not the puzzle can possibly be solved without
otherwise unmotivated alterations in the terms of the problem first, before falling back
on changing the terms of the problem. (Non-linearity, open systems, hidden variables,
information, coarse-graining, etc.)
9.An analysis of the physics of actual measurement apparatuses, e.g., amplification,
would be likely to point the way to an answer. It would seem natural to suppose that the
phenomena of measurement depend on the physics of measurement apparatuses! (Either
that, or on the physics of interaction with the environment, but that should be a fall back
in case the analysis of the physics of amplification is unsuccessful.)
10.A priori philosophical assumptions should not be allowed much weight against a
theory that agrees with experiment. These include interpretations of physical probability,
psycho-physical parallelism, monism, etc. On the other hand, J.S. Bell’s requirements
of logical coherence, stating clearly what is assumed and distinguishing it from what is
proved, are not a priori philosophical assumptions, they are criteria needed before one
even *had* a theory to compare with experiment at all in the first place.
Experimental result means *replicable*. Something experienced does not count as an
experimental result unless it is replicable. Nature and Heisenberg have taught us that only
the probabilities of our subjectively experienced conscious meter-readings are replicable,
therefore only the probabilities are experimental results, and a theory that disagrees with
our conscious perceptions does not thereby disagree with experiment.
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Several important papers have been written which accept Thesis 9. However, they
are far from the spirit of Hilbert’s problem. In fact, for the reason J. S. Bell pointed to,
they are anti-axiomatic. It is anti-axiomatic to pass from a density matrix with vanishing
off-diagonal terms to a probability interpretation, or, as Bell puts it, ‘to pass from an
*and* to an *or*.’ ‘The idea that elimination of coherence, in one way or another, implies
the replacement of “and” by “or”, is a very common one among solvers of the “measure-
ment problem”. It has always puzzled me.’ (loc. cit.) By elimination of coherence, for
example, he refers to the disappearance of off-diagonal terms in the density matrix. Under
Schroedinger’s influence, H. S. Green wrote Nuovo Cimento 9 (1958), 880, which treats
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a negative temperature heat bath as making a transition under a microscopic stimulus.
Daneri–Loinger–Prosperi, Nucl. Phys. 33 (1962), 297, analysed in general a similar sit-
uation. K. Hannabuss, Helv. Phys. Acta 57 (1984), 610; Ann. Phys. (NY) 239 (1995),
296 is more explicit still. Allahverdyan–Balian–Nieuwenhuizen (cond-mat/0102428) have
explicitly analysed a driven phase transition as a model of the measurement process. These
treatments all transgress axiomatic procedures in general and theses 3, 5, and 7 in particu-
lar, which is alright since they are physics papers, not purporting to be axiomatic or solve
a Hilbert problem. Johnson (2003) quant-ph/0502044 is similar, in underlying physical
mechanism, to the above, but is axiomatic in spirit as Wigner was in his posing of the
problem of Quantum Duality (and has a different explicit definition of macroscopic pointer
variable).
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